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Near the end of 2013, an outbreak of Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) began in Guinea, subsequently spreading to neighboring
Liberia and Sierra Leone. As this epidemic grew, important public health questions emerged about how and why this
outbreak was so different from previous episodes. This review provides a synthetic synopsis of the 2014–15 outbreak,
with the aim of understanding its unprecedented spread. We present a summary of the history of previous epidemics,
describe the structure and genetics of the ebolavirus, and review our current understanding of viral vectors and the
latest treatment practices. We conclude with an analysis of the public health challenges epidemic responders faced
and some of the lessons that could be applied to future outbreaks of Ebola or other viruses.
Keywords: Ebola, Ebolavirus, 2014 outbreak, Epidemic, Review
Abbreviations: BEBOV, Bundibugyo ebolavirus; CIEBOV, Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus; EBOV, Ebolavirus; EVD, Ebola virus disease
or Ebola; Kb, Kilobase; MSF, Médecins Sans Frontières; REBOV, Reston ebolavirus; SEBOV, Sudan ebolavirus; WHO, World
Health Organization; ZEBOV, Zaire ebolavirusBackground
As of April 13th, 2016 there have been 28,652 total cases
of Ebola virus disease (EVD; or more generally Ebola) in
the 2014–2015 West African epidemic [1]. Of these,
11,325 cases (40 %) were fatal [1]. During this epidemic,
the vast majority of cases were concentrated in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, with a handful of cases
imported to countries around the world [1]. This was
the first outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, and the most
significant Ebola epidemic that has occurred worldwide
since the virus was first described [2]. Here, we review
the current understanding of biology and genetics of
the virus, the past and current epidemiology, and the
public health response to the 2014–15 Ebola outbreak.Ebolavirus genetics
The ebolavirus is a member of the family filoviridae,
which is composed of single-stranded negative-sense
enveloped RNA viruses [3]. These filamentous viruses
are ~19 kilobases (kb) in length (800–1100 nanometers
[nm] long and 80 nm in diameter) [4]. The ebolavirus
genome contains seven genes (3′ NP VP35 VP40 GP
VP30 VP24 L 5′ [5]) encoding a number of proteins:* Correspondence: schaackmobile@gmail.com
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(matrix protein), GP (glycoprotein), VP30 (transcrip-
tion activator), VP24 (secondary matrix protein), and
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase [6]. There are currently
five recognized species of ebolavirus: Zaire ebolavirus
(ZEBOV), Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV), Reston ebolavirus
(REBOV) (non-pathogenic to humans), Côte d’Ivoire ebo-
lavirus (CIEBOV) also known as Tai Forest ebolavirus and
Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BEBOV) [5, 7].
Estimates of the rate of nucleotide substitution for
filoviruses suggest that these viruses have substitution
rates approximately 100× times lower than other RNA
viruses (e. g. retroviruses and influenza A) [8]. Based on
these substitution rates, studies have concluded that
ebolavirus and marburgvirus, a closely related filovirus
that is also pathogenic in humans, likely diverged from
each other several thousand years ago and that the
different species of ebolavirus diverged from each other
within the last ~1000 years ago [8, 9]. Genetic analysis
of strains from the 2014–2015 West African Ebola
epidemic have been hindered, in part, due to the limited
understanding of the biology of this virus and further
exacerbated by delays in sample export, bad record
keeping, and a small number of trained specialists
[10, 11]. Gire et al. [12] analyzed 81 EBOV sequences,
78 newly derived from patients in Sierra Leone and 3
previously published Guinean sequences, and foundle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
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morphisms. They concluded that the substitution rate
during this outbreak is roughly twice as high as those
previously reported. Other studies show contrasting
results, however; e.g. Spielman et al. [13] and Hoenen
et al. [14] analyzed sequences from the recent epidemic
and reported a mutation rates of 9.6 × 10−4 and 1.3 × 10−3
substitutions per site per year, respectively, which are
similar to those reported during past outbreaks.
A more recent study by Carroll et al. [15] used 197
new viral sequences in addition to publicly-available
sequences to trace the evolution of the viral genome
throughout the epidemic. They estimated the date of the
most recent common ancestor of the sampled viruses to
be between December 12th, 2013 and February 18th,
2014, which is supported by epidemiological evidence
that places the index case in late December 2013 [15].
Another recent study by Simon-Loriere et al. [16] ana-
lyzed 85 new sequences from Guinean patients along
with 110 publicly-available EBOV sequences from this
outbreak and reported a mutation rate of 0.87 × 10−3 to
0.91 × 10−3 substitutions per site per year. They point
out that evolutionary rates in RNA viruses can be strongly
time-dependent, with higher rates observed over short
time spans than long ones [16]. This may explain why
certain estimates of mutation rates during this recent
epidemic have been higher than expected.
Past Ebola outbreaks
Since the first outbreak 40 years ago, EVD outbreaks
have been rare, small and localized. The first recorded
outbreak of EVD took place in Zaire (now the De-
mocratic Republic of the Congo) in 1976, close to the
Yambuku Catholic Mission Hospital located near the
Ebola River Valley [7]. At the same time, a separate out-
break of EVD occurred near Maridi in West Equatoria
Region in Sudan [7]. Prior to 2014, the largest recorded
outbreak of Ebola (SEBOV in this case) took place in
Uganda from October 2000 to January 2001, with 425
cases and 225 deaths [17, 18].
After the discovery of the virus, a large variety of
organisms were screened as possible Ebola reservoirs.
Bats both efficiently replicate the virus and survive infec-
tion, which made them standout as candidate reservoirs
[4]. Despite this initial evidence, the first direct evidence
that bats are reservoir hosts of ebolavirus was reported
in a field study in 2005, almost 30 years after the discov-
ery of the virus [19]. Immunoglobulin G (IgG) specific
for ebolavirus was found in serum from bats of three
different species of fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus,
Epomps franqueti, and Myonycteris torquata) and phylo-
genetic analysis showed that they were most likely close
relatives of ZEBOV strains [19]. Ebolavirus antibodies
have since been reported in numerous bat species frommany locations, suggesting that infection (and survival)
is frequent [4]. Retrospective analysis shows that wildlife
deaths (non-human primates and antelope) tend to pre-
cede human infections, which this could have important
surveillance implications in terms of preventing future
outbreaks [20]. In addition, population declines in
apes have also been chronologically linked to human
Ebola outbreaks and a number of molecular studies
have linked primate ebolavirus cases to human Ebola
outbreaks [4].
Although two types of transmission (animal-to-human
and human-to-human) have been observed, nosocomial
transmission has played a key role in the spread of
Ebola. Transmission from animals has taken place via
the handling and butchering of infected animals, inc-
luding bats, non-human primates and duikers (a small
forest antelope) [21]. Healthcare workers are especially
at risk for exposure to Ebola because they are more
likely to come into contact with contaminated bodily
fluids [22]. The traditional funeral and burial practices in
West Africa involve washing the body by hand before
burial and paying respect to the dead through physical
contact which are both exceptionally high-risk activities
with regard to the spread of Ebola [23]. The incubation
period for Ebola can range from two to 21 days, but is
usually one to two weeks [24]. There is no evidence that
Ebola is contagious during the incubation period, while
infected individuals are still asymptomatic [25]. The
World Health Organization (WHO) will only declare an
Ebola outbreak over once 42 days (two incubation pe-
riods) have passed with no new infections reported [26].
Interrupting Ebola transmission requires rapid identifi-
cation of cases, contact tracing, and monitoring of
people identified as high risk [22, 27]. Based on a retro-
spective study of the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit DRC, the
greatest risk factor for secondary household transmission
of Ebola is direct contact with someone who has clinic-
ally apparent illness [28]. This risk increases if there is
contact with bodily fluids or the infected person is in the
late stages of the disease. Direct contact was determined
to be necessary, but not sufficient, for transmission [28].
To date, the only comprehensive analysis of viral excre-
tion and environmental contamination from Ebola found
viral particles are present in blood, breast milk, saliva,
semen, feces, and tears [29]. A review of relevant lite-
rature by Thorsen et al. [30] found that the longest re-
corded persistence of EBOV in semen is 284 days. While
viral RNA was isolated from this sample, it is not known
if the viral particles were still infectious. Viable Ebola
virus has been found in semen 82 days post-infection
and may be present much longer than this [30]. Further
complicating efforts to understand transmission was the
recent report of sexual transmission confirmed by both












































































Fig. 1 Average R0s for common epidemic diseases, including Ebola,
at the height of the 2014 epidemic [43, 64–67]
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after the onset of disease in the male patient [31].
The standard treatment for Ebola patients has not
changed in the last 50 years and consists of symptomatic
and supportive care [24]. Supportive care involves either
oral or intravenous rehydration and electrolyte manage-
ment; while symptomatic care involves the use of drugs
to reduce vomiting and diarrhea, along with medication
to treat fever and pain [32–34]. Patients with high malaria
risk are also given anti-malarial medication and antibiotics
to preemptively treat common infections that may hamper
their ability to fight Ebola. Currently, drugs being de-
veloped to treat Ebola work by inhibiting viral replication
either by targeting viral transcripts for degradation, blo-
cking translation, or acutely neutralizing the virus [35].
Other treatments that are being studied include passive
immunotherapy (blood transfusion from survivors) and
mechanical filtering of patient blood [36, 37].
Epidemiological dynamics of the 2014–2015 Ebola
epidemic
Understanding epidemiological dynamics can be challen-
ging during an outbreak when mortality rates are high
and practical concerns, such as healthcare worker safety,
need to be prioritized [38]. The main metric used to
understand how fast a virus spread is R0, the basic
reproduction number [39, 40]. For Liberia, estimates
place R0 at 1.59, 1.36 and 1.83 according to three differ-
ent studies [41] Pandey et al. 2014, [2]. In Guinea, R0
has been estimated at 1.5 and 1.71 [2, 41]. Three separ-
ate studies posit very different R0 values for Ebola in
Sierra Leone. One estimates an R0 of 2.53, another esti-
mates 2.02, and a third estimates 1.4 [2, 41, 42]. The
third estimate was generated using a model based on
clustered social interactions rather than assuming ran-
dom mixing between individuals, and may therefore be
more accurate [42]. According to the United Nations
(UN) the overall R0 for the whole epidemic was ap-
proximately 1.4 in September (Fig. 1) and had fallen to
below 1.0 in December 2014 [43].
The 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic
All infections in the 2014–2015 West African ZEBOV
epidemic can be traced back to an index case that was
reported from an 18-month-old boy from the village of
Meliandou, Guinea in December 2013 [43–45]. A retro-
spective investigation by Saéz et al. [46] posits that the
index case was infected by contact with insectivorous
bats. The first official medical alert was issued on
January 24th, 2014 when the head of the Meliandou
health post informed district health officials of five cases
of severe and rapidly fatal diarrhea. A subsequent inves-
tigation by local health officials indicated that the symp-
toms appeared to match cholera (also endemic to thisregion), a conclusion later supported by bacteria found
in patient samples [23]. On February 1st, 2014 Ebola
reached Conakry, the Guinean capital, through an in-
fected member of the index case’s extended family, who
died 4 days later, but by that time had initiated multiple
chains of transmission [23]. The Guinea Ministry of
Health issued its first alert about the then unidentified
disease on March 13th, 2014 and the regional office of
the WHO opened an investigation the same day, sus-
pecting Lassa fever (a hemorrhagic fever endemic to the
region). The next day, the Pasteur Institute in France
confirmed that the pathogen infecting patients was
ZEBOV and on March 23rd, 2014 the WHO publicly
announced the outbreak with 49 confirmed cases and 29
deaths [23].
From early June to mid-September, the epidemic grew
exponentially in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, with
national case number doubling times of between 16 and
30 days [2]. Against this backdrop, the scaling up of the
international response began on July 9th, 2014, when the
United Nations Security Council issued a statement
expressing its deep concern about the Ebola epidemic
and implored the international community to provide
prompt assistance to prevent the further spread of the
virus [43]. On August 8th, 2014, the WHO declared the
outbreak an international public health emergency [2].
Over a month later on September 18th, 2014, with 5,000
reported cases and almost 2,500 deaths, the UN Security
Council held its first ever emergency meeting on a
public health crisis [43].
The first recorded human-human transmission of
EBOV outside of Africa occurred in Madrid, Spain. On
September 30th, 2014, a nurse became sick after treating
an Ebola patient who had been transferred to Spain from
West Africa [47, 48]. She eventually made a full recovery
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cases occurred in the United States and further ignited
fears internationally of Ebola risk. Thomas Eric Duncan,
a native of Liberia, flew from Liberia to Dallas, TX on
September 19th, 2014 [49]. He became ill several days
later and went to the emergency room of Texas Health
Presbyterian Hospital on September 25th where he was
diagnosed with sinusitis and discharged with antibiotics
[49]. He returned to the emergency room three days
later in much worse condition and was admitted to the
hospital [49]. Tests for EBOV came back positive on
September 30th and Duncan passed away on October 8th
[49, 50]. Subsequently, two nurses who had been in-
volved in Duncan’s treatment became ill and tested
positive for Ebola on October 12 and 15th, respectively
[47, 50]. Both nurses made a full recovery and were re-
leased from the hospital [47].
On March 29th 2016 the WHO declared the end of
the Public Health Emergency of International Concern
regarding Ebola in West Africa [51]. Liberia was initially
declared Ebola-free on May 9th, 2015, however several
more clusters of Ebola cases have occurred over the past
year. A cluster of six cases was reported in June 2015,
Liberia was eventually declared Ebola-free on September
3rd 2015. Another cluster of three cases was reported in
November 2015. Liberia was declared Ebola-free for the
third time January 14th 2015 and has not reported any
new Ebola cases since that time [1]. Sierra Leone was
first declared Ebola-free on November 7th, 2015. Two
new cases were reported in January 2016; following
these cases Seirra Leone was declared Ebola-free on
March 7th 2016 [1]. Guinea was declared Ebola-free on
December 29th, 2015, but reported five new cases in
late March 2016 [1].
West Africa after Ebola
According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF; also known
as Doctors Without Borders), no one knows the true
number of deaths caused by the 2014–2015 Ebola epi-
demic [52]. The lack of basic healthcare means that over-
all morality rates have dramatically increased, in addition
to deaths resulting from direct viral infections [52, 53].
For example, vaccination rates for common illnesses have
also dropped—it is estimated as of March 2015 over a
million more children will have not been vaccinated
against measles than there were before the epidemic
began [54]. The number of people who lack food security
as a result of the 2014 Ebola epidemic is estimated to be
in the hundreds of thousands and is expected to continue
to rise [53]. Prior to the epidemic, healthcare in these
countries was severely underfunded– in 2012 the Liberian
government spent $20 per person per year on healthcare,
Sierra Leone $16 and Guinea $9. This is far below the
minimum of $86 recommended by the World HealthOrganization to provide essential health services [53].
Including international aid, the total cost of the epidemic
response is estimated at $4.3 billion USD so far [53].
Maternal health in West Africa has been dramatically
affected by the Ebola epidemic. Pregnancy appears to
make people more vulnerable to the effects of Ebola in-
fection, particularly increasing their risk of hemorrhage
[55]. All pregnancies of women infected with Ebola end
in spontaneous miscarriage, stillbirth, or neonatal death
within a few days [56]. There is evidence that the Ebola
virus is able to cross from the placenta into both the
amniotic fluid and fetus [56]. Besides the risks to the
mother, the large amount of blood and bodily fluids
present at deliveries present a huge risk of infection for
healthcare workers [55]. A lot of the symptoms of preg-
nancy related complications overlap with EVD and this
is further complicated by the poor condition of maternal
health care in West Africa [56]. Many healthcare workers
have refused to treat pregnant patients in countries with
widespread Ebola infection until they have tested negative
for EVD due to the risk of exposure, which poses a serious
problem for women in need of invasive emergency proce-
dures [56]. Refusal of treatment combined with fears
about Ebola has meant that many people have stopped
showing up for prenatal visits or assistance with delivery
[55]. The United Nations Population Fund estimates that
the Ebola epidemic will, either directly or indirectly, result
in as many as 120,000 maternal deaths by the end of
October 2015 [55].
Another area of concern is psychological care for
Ebola survivors and family members of Ebola patients
[57]. The epidemic has created many psychological
stresses beyond fear of the disease itself, including
declining economies, closed borders and markets, and
widespread hunger [58]. Discrimination against families
affected by Ebola and international stigma against coun-
tries with widespread Ebola infections also contribute to
the development of mental health problems in affected
communities [58]. There is a severe scarcity of mental
health workers in West Africa making delivery of effect-
ive care even more difficult [58]. Currently, a shift in the
global health community’s attitude toward mental health
is resulting in more funding for mental health programs,
and the WHO has started to address psychological care
in its reports [57]. While these are encouraging signs,
there is still a long way to go before Ebola survivors and
families of Ebola victims receive adequate support.
International engagement in public health
According to the WHO, Ebola in West Africa is an
example of “an old virus in a new context”, which sums
up some of the unique challenges faced during the Ebola
response in West Africa [23]. From early June to mid-
September 2015 the epidemic grew exponentially in
Kaner and Schaack Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:53 Page 5 of 7Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, with national case
number doubling times between 16 and 30 days [23].
Against this backdrop, the scaling up of the international
response to the West African Ebola epidemic began on
July 9th, 2014, when the United Nations Security Council
issued a statement expressing its deep concern about the
Ebola epidemic and implored the international commu-
nity to provide prompt assistance to prevent the further
spread of the virus [43].
As of April 2015, there were 176 organizations operat-
ing emergency programs in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone [59]. At this point, the total number of Ebola
treatment unit beds exceeded the number of reported
Ebola patients and there were enough burial teams in
place to ensure safe and dignified burials for all deaths
due to Ebola [59]. However, due to uneven distribution
of these resources and the continued fear and suspicion
of Ebola treatment hospitals and burial teams in local
communities, many patients were still going without
treatment or safe burials, resulting in new infections.
According to the UN task force, the epidemic response
needs to be tailored to adapt to the wide geographic
spread of Ebola even as the outbreak diminishes [59].
According to the WHO, this outbreak demonstrated
the severe lack of international capacity to respond to
public health crises [23]. It has been estimated that more
than 30,000 children were orphaned by this epidemic
[23]. Access to routine healthcare has also been severely
effected by the outbreak, resulting in increased mortality
from common and chronic illnesses [59]. One year after
the official declaration of the 2014 Ebola epidemic, MSF
released a report critiquing the lack of international
engagement with the epidemic response [52], specific-
ally, MSF president Dr. Joanne Liu who pointed out that
the lack of international political motivation to intervene
in West Africa ended in July 2014 when the first case of
Ebola was diagnosed outside of Africa [52]. It was only
at this time that the outbreak could no longer be seen as
a humanitarian crisis affecting a few poor countries in
Africa, but instead began to be viewed as an inter-
national security threat to developed countries. This
report by MSF also concluded that the interconnected-
ness of the modern world means that world leaders can
no longer ignore health crises in distant countries [52].
As a result of this epidemic, several influential edito-
rials have called for renewed attention to international
public health issues. Bill Gates commented that the
problem was less that the current system did not work
well enough, but more that a system barely existed at all
[60]. In his editorial published in the New York Times,
Gates asserted that we must create a global warning and
response system for outbreaks with a focus on building
health systems within countries that can also be used
for disease surveillance. He suggested creating a globalwarning and response system for outbreaks, increasing
disease surveillance, and funding additional research into
drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests, as well as creating a
system for accelerating the approval of these interventions
during a crisis [60]. Jeremy Farrar of the Wellcome Trust,
and Seth Berkley of GAVI The Vaccine Alliance, argued
that much more should have been done before this
outbreak, in terms of vaccine studies and vaccine approval
protocols [61]. Funding for research and development of
drugs and vaccines for diseases likely to cause future
epidemics, even though these are not the diseases that are
the most lucrative for drug companies, may be a key
component of preventing future outbreaks [61].
Conclusions: what we have learned
The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa highlighted
major deficiencies in the ability of the international
public health and scientific communities to respond to
infectious disease emergencies. It also provided a stark
reminder of the consequences of not investing in the
development of healthcare infrastructure in developing
countries. The current system of drug and vaccine devel-
opment favors the development of drugs and vaccines
for chronic diseases that primarily affect people in the
developed world, rather than diseases likely to cause
epidemics. According to Currie et al. [62], the develop-
ment of a mechanism for international cooperation in
vaccine development and licensing is an urgent priority.
The first step in preventing or minimizing future epi-
demics is to create an effective global monitoring system
for newly emerging pathogens. This relies on improving
healthcare infrastructure around the world, resulting in a
network of healthcare professionals who could serve as an
early warning system for disease outbreaks. It is important
that knowledge from a variety of disciplines is employed
to create a multifaceted approach to future outbreaks [62].
Another important facet of the global response to disease
outbreaks is the rapid mobilization of personnel and
resources. Thirdly, the Ebola outbreak has demonstrated
the risk that international mobility and air travel poses to
infection control, including the panic that can ensue when
infected people move across international borders. The
role of mobility and the importance of allocating resources
to understand transmission and epidemiological risk has
been underscored during the recent Zika virus outbreak,
in part because of its previously unknown symptoms and
transmission dynamics (reviewed in [63])
Ultimately the 2014 Ebola epidemic has shown that infec-
tion control measures can fail and that there is a significant
risk from infectious disease worldwide. The risks posed by
disease outbreaks are complicated by the lack of under-
standing of the basic biology, limited access to healthcare,
poor infrastructure, and increased mobilization. Adequate
scientific research and preparation, backed by careful policy
Kaner and Schaack Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:53 Page 6 of 7implementation, are likely the key to limiting and respond-
ing effectively to future epidemics. Lessons learned from
past outbreaks can be applied to prevent or minimize the
impact of future outbreaks locally and globally.
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